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MuNICIPAL CoRPORATIONs-CmcuMVENTING MuNICIPAL DEBT
LIMITATIONS-Since municipalities are frequently indebted to the
permissible extent of the constitutional, statutory, and charter debt
limitations, they are constantly seeking methods of finance which avoid
the debt limits. Three devices have ·received judicial sanction. First:
Where a separate and distinct. corporation such as a school or drain
district has been created it may operate with a separate debt limit over
the same territory as the governing municipality.1 Second: Where the
project to be financed is income-producing, the financing bond issue,
if made self-liquidating, will not Gome within the debt limitations.
Although incorporated authorities have been extensively used to administer self-liquidating bond issues,2 the "special fund" doctrine has
permitted cities to finance self-liquidating, income-producing projects
-without farming the job out to an authority.3 Third: Where a city
makes a long term lease for rec;urring needs, which is not a disguised
contract of purchase, only the yearly instalment and not the aggregate
rental is considered a debt for purposes of limitations.4
These methods of permissible finance have been the product of a
slow evolution of judicial opinion. From ail early strict interpretation
of the debt limitations the tendency has been toward an increasingly
liberal interpretation. The overlapping coq,oration device was first
sanctioned because it was familiar. The school, drain and similar dis- .
tricts have roots as deep in history as the debt limitations themselves.5
To build the special fund doctrine, it seems the courts resorted to the
·spirit of the debt limitations. The purpose of the limitations was to
keep proP.erty from being subjected to an unrestricted and fixed tax
1 Cerajewski v. McVey, 225 Ind. 67, 72 N.E. (2d) 650 (1947); Atty. Gen. v. Thompson, 168 Mich. 511, 134 N.W. 722 (1912); 94 A.L.R. 818 (1935); 171 A.L.R. 723 (1947).
See l McQmLLIN, MuNICIPAL CoRPORATIONS §283 (1940).
2Edwards v. Housing Authority of City of Muncie, 215 Ind. 330, 19 N.E. (2d) 741
(1939); In re Brewster Street Housing Site, 291 Mich. 313, 289 N.W. 493 (1939); 146
A.L.R. 328 at 339 (1943). See Foley, "Revenue Financing of Public Enterprises," 35 MxcH.
L. REv. l (1936).
.
.3 See Foley, "Low Rent. and State Financing," 85 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 239, 248
(1937). For recent extensions of the special fund doctrine see 29 NEB. L. REv. 75 (1949).
Most states now have revenue financing acts which in effect codify the special fund doctrine.
See Underwood v. Fairbanks Morse and Co., 205 Ind. 316, 185 N.E. ll8 (1933); Indiana
Service Corp. v. Town of Warren, 206 Ind. 384, 189 N.E. 523 (1934); Young v. City of
Ann Arbor, 267 Mich. 241, 255 N.W. 579 (1934). See also Foley, ''Revenue Financing of
Public Enterprises," 35 MxcH. L. REv. l (1936).
4 71 A.L.R. 1318 (1931); 145 A.L.R. "1362 (1943). See also 103 A.L.R. ll60 (1936).
5 Atty. Gen. v. Thompson, 168 Mich. 511, 134 N.W. 722 (1912).
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burden; the financing of an income producing project through a selfliquidating bond issue does not create a tax burden. 6
At some point, of course, inroads through liberal interpretation
will spell disintegration of an effective debt limit. It is apparent that
this tendency must be kept within bounds; the problem is to fix the
bounds. Two recent cases, from Indiana and Michigan, present an
interesting contrast in judicial attitude toward financing methods which
attempt to circumvent the debt limitations.
The Indiana court, in Rappaport 11. Department of Public Health, 1
had to pass upon a use of the overlapping corporation device. Legislation had permitted the creation of ·new health departments and
taxing districts in cities with a population of over 300,000. Such
departments and districts were- to have a separate debt limitation and
the power to issue bonds and lay a special tax on district property
for the construction and maintenance of hospitals. The Indiana
court recognized that the state constitutional debt limit does not
prevent more than one municipal unit from operating in identical
territory. The court, however; in declaring the legislation unconstitutional avowed· a purpose to "look through form to substance"8 to see
if the legislative intent had been to evade the debt limitation. The
degree of city control over the new department was a fac~or in determining the question of evasion. More important, it seems, was the
fact that the court viewed the building and maintenance of hospitals
as a traditional and typical city function. The court hypothesized
that if a separate governmental unit may be created to finance hospitals
"why not a city hall or any other essential city function or building?"9
In looking to the purpose of debt limitations and to the nature of the
function which the new district is to perform, the Indiana court seems
to have found a working general approach which it can ·apply to all
methods of municipal finance. There is no indication that the court
will limit this approach to the device of the overlapping corporation.
The Michigan court, in Walinske 11. Detroit-Wayne Joint Building
Authority,1° had to pass upon a more recent and more subtle device.
After the voters of Wayne County rejected a proposal to increase tax
6 Hight v. City of Harrisonville, 328 Mo. 549, 41 S.W. (2d) 155 (1931); Edwards v.
Housing Authority of City of Muncie, 215 Ind. 330, 19 N.E. (2d) 741 (1939).
1 (Ind. 1949) 87 N.E. (2d) 77.
SJd. at 80.
9 Id. at 82.
10 325 Mich. 562, 39 N.W. (2d) 73 (1949).
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millage and create an eight million dollar bond issue for the construction of a joint City of Detroit-Wayne County administration building,
the state legislature passed an enabling act .under which the city and
county jointly incorporated a Building Authority empowered by the
enabling act to construct an administration building financed by a selfliquidating bond issue. The bonds to be issued by the Authority, were
to be payable solely from the revenue from the building; the revenue
would be the rent which the city and county would p~y for the use of
the building. No lease had yet been drawn but the enabling act permitted, and the Authority charter required, the building to be conveyed
to the city and county after the bond issue had been retired. The charter
provided for a thirty-year lease with power in the Authority to adjust
rentals to retire the bond issue within that time.
The Michigan court, in upholding the enabling act, has sanctioned
an ingenious combination of Authority financing, the special fund ·
doctrine, and the doctrine of the lease for recurring needs. It is clear
that cities may be enabled to incorporate Authorities with a separate
and distinct legal entity that may own, finance, and administer a selfliquidating project.11 From the standpoint· of this legally separate
Authority the project is income-producing and self-liquidating albeit
the income, in the form of lease rentals, is tax money. As far as the
city is concerned it is merely making a long term lease which is not
_a debt in its aggregate. 12 By a very legalistic approach the Michigan
court was able to say that this is a debt of the Authority and not the
debt of the city and county. The.Authority cannot tax and so the
scheme does not come within the prohibitions of the debt limitations.
It would seem that the reasoning upholding this particular device
is the direct antithesis of the reasoning behind the special fund doctrine.
11 See note 2, supra.
12 The Michigan court had

to answer the objection that the enabling act and the authority
charter contemplated a contract of purchase which would constitute a debt in the amount of
the aggregate rental. The court reasoned that since the final disposition of the building was
not being decided, and since the 11::ase had not yet been drawn, the proposed transaction could
not be called a contract of purchase. The lease when drawn will undoubtedly reflect the
guidance of the court and make no provision for conveying the building to the city and county.
After the bond issue is liquidated, there would seem to be nothing to prevent the authority
from donating the building to the city and county. A very similar situation was before the
Pennsylvania court in Kelley v. Earle, 320 Pa. 449, 182 A. 501 (1936). The court held that
a contemplated conveyance from authority to state made the lease a contract of purchase. On
rehearing, inKelleyv. Earle, 325 Pa. 337, 190 A. 140 (1937), noted in 85 UNIV. PA. L. fuv.
518 (1937), the court upheld an amended plan which called for title to remain in the
authority. If so obvious a device can make the difference, it would seem the Michigan court
is realistic in upholding the device in the first instance.
·
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The special fund doctrine proceeds on the theory that even though
a particular bond issue represents a city debt, the debt does not come
within the purpose of the debt limitations because it is not liquidated
by tax money. To sanction this latest device the court must say, in
effect, that even though this bond issue is liquidated by tax money, it
is not a city debt. In Michigan, it seems, a scheme may be successful
if it appeals either to purpose or to form; it need not appeal to both.13
The Indiana and - the Michigan cases· can undoubtedly be distinguished on their facts. In their reasoning, however, the two
opinions seem to be squarely opposed. The Indiana court looks through
form to the substance of the scheme. If the effect is merely to increase
borrowing power rather than to perform a public service better the
Indiana court will find an evasion of the debt limit. The Michigan
court is content if the form of the scheme of finance is legally defensible since "there is no fraud in reaching a desired end by legal
means even though some other means to the end would be illegal."14
The Indiana court seems to be on more solid ground. It will, according
to the Rappaport case, examine each scheme of .finance by the admittedly Huid tests of the constitutiomd purpose of debt limitations and
the legislative intent to evade such limitations. In Michigan, on the
other hand, it seems the bars are down. Consistently with the W alinske
case there would appear to be nothing to prevent the legislature from
enabling authorities to build and finance, and cities to lease non-revenue-producing museums, fire houses, police stations or other similar projects.
The result in the Michigan case may be laudable. Detroit and
Wayne county will, at the end of thirty years, be the owners of a ten
13 The general trend of the decisions seems to be in favor of the device of leasing from an
authority. The Pennsylvania court in Kelley v. Earle upheld the device. See note 12, supra.
The Illinois court, in People v. Green, 382 ill. 577, 47 N.E. (2d) 465 (1943), distinguished
the Kelley case on the ground that in the Kelley case there was an element of income which
saved the plan. In a later Illinois case, People v. Green was in turn distinguished. The court
held an act valid which created an armocy authority with power to lease to the state. The
plan in the Green case was said to be bad because there was no legal separation of identity
between authority and state since the directors of the authority were to be the governor and
other state officials. Loomis v. Keehn, 400 ill. 337, 80 N.E. (2d) 368 (1948). In Ohio there
were two attempts to finance the building and maintenance of mental institutions through the
authority device. Both the original and the revised plan were held invalid. State v. Griffith,
135 Ohio St. 604, 22 N.E. (2d) 200 (1939), and State v. Neffner, 137 Ohio St. 390, 30 N.E.
(2d) 705 (1940). All the cases in this note involve the creation of state authorities. The
Michigan court seems to have been the only court to rule squarely that municipalities may use
this particular device. There would seem to be no logical basis to distinguish between state
and municipal authorities.
·
14 The court quotes from Bacon v. City of Detroit, 282 Mich. 150 at 158, 275 N.W.
800 (1937).
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million dollar building ~t a cost of only slightly more than they would
have to pay in rentals to private parties over the same period. No doubt
this was a major factor in the court's decision. Almost every relaxation in the application of the debt limits has been prompted by the
realization that the debt limits do very often lead to inefficient methods
of finance and curtailment or denial of vital services. On the other
hand, debt limits were imposed not to promote economy and efficiency,
but to prevent municipalities from overpledging themselves and to
keep the fixed tax burden within definite bounds. It is no wonder that
these conflicting factors have impressed courts in unequal degree. By
reverting to the fundamental purpose, the Indiana court has made
the debt limit a living thing. In Michigan, for many practical purposes,
the debt limit is dead. Although it blocks the path in which it. died,
the detours are open.
Joseph F. Gricar, S.Ed.

